Antinatalism and Moral Particularism by Harrison, G
Essays in Philosophy
Volume 20
Issue 1 Is Procreation Immoral? Article 5
1-22-2019
Antinatalism and Moral Particularism
Gerald K. Harrison
Massey University, g.k.harrison@massey.ac.nz
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.pacificu.edu/eip
Essays in Philosophy is a biannual journal published by Pacific University Library | ISSN 1526-0569 | http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/
Recommended Citation
Harrison, Gerald K. () "Antinatalism and Moral Particularism," Essays in Philosophy: Vol. 20: Iss. 1, Article 5. https://doi.org/10.7710/
1526-0569.1629
© 2019 Harrison. This open access article is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
ISSN 1526-0569 | Essays in Philosophy is published by the Pacific University Libraries
Antinatalism and Moral Particularism
Volume 20, Issue 1 (2019)
Abstract
I believe most acts of human procreation are immoral, and I believe this despite also believing in the truth 
of moral particularism.   In this paper I explain why.  I argue that procreative acts possess numerous features 
that, in other contexts, seem typically to operate with negative moral valences.   Other things being equal this 
gives us reason to believe they will operate negatively in the context of procreative acts as well.  However, most 
people’s intuitions represent procreative acts to be morally permissible in most circumstances.  Given moral 
particularism, this would normally be good evidence that procreative acts are indeed morally permissible 
and that the features that operate negatively elsewhere, simply do not do so in the context of procreative acts 
in particular.   But I argue that we have no good reason to think our intuitions about the ethics of human 
procreation are accurate.  Our most reliable source of insight into the ethics human procreative acts are not 
our intuitions those acts themselves, but our intuitions about the typical moral valences of the features such 
acts possess.   If that is correct, then acts of human procreation are most likely wrong. 
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Introduction 
I am a moral particularist and an antinatalist. That is, I believe in the inherent variability 
of moral valences, and I believe that, exceptional circumstances aside, acts of human 
procreation are most likely wrong.
At first glance this seems like an odd combination of views. Most acts of human procre-
ation appear to be morally permissible to most people. Other things being equal, this is 
excellent evidence that this is precisely what they are. Even if I can locate in them many 
features that in other contexts seem typically to operate as wrong-makers—and this is 
exactly what I will be doing in what follows—the fact that procreative acts themselves ap-
pear morally permissible suggests that those features are not operating as wrong-makers 
in the context of procreative acts in particular. So, of all plausible views about the nature 
of ethics, moral particularism seems especially inhospitable to antinatalism. 
However, I shall argue that such appearances are deceptive. The widespread intuition 
that, in the main, procreative acts are morally permissible, lacks any real probative force. 
By contrast, there is no similar reason to believe the same thing about the intuitions that 
find many of the features of procreative acts to be wrong-makers. As this is now our most 
reliable source of insight into the ethics of human procreation, I conclude that it is most 
likely immoral.
Moral Particularism
I call myself a normative particularist because I am at present convinced that any con-
sideration that generates a positive normative reason—which I, in line with most others, 
would characterize as a favoring of doing or believing something—in one context can 
just as easily generate a negative normative reason—a disfavoring—in another, and no 
favoring or disfavoring at all in others. That is, to put it in the terminology that some 
prefer, a consideration that has a positive normative valence in one context can have a 
negative normative valence in another, and no normative valence whatsoever in others.
By itself this does not entail normative particularism, because it is consistent with this 
thesis that there may be a rigid pattern to how any particular feature’s normative valence 
behaves, such that one could, in principle, formulate rules that describe it.1 But, and for 
me this is essential to being a normative particularist, I believe there is no necessity to 
any pattern there may be. That is, there is both no necessity to there being a pattern—so 
1  Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge, “What Does Holism Have to Do with Moral Particularism?” 
Ratio 18, no. 1 (2005): 93–103. 
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though there may be a pattern, there does not have to be—but even if there is a pattern, it 
does not have to be rigid across time and space. Normative patterns, if patterns there be, 
are always contingent, not necessary. So, even if consideration P seems to have a negative 
normative valence in every situation we can conceive of, this does not entail that it must 
do so, and will always and everywhere continue to do so.2   
For clarity, consider an analogy. Put aside the favoring relations constitutive of moral 
and other normative reasons and consider instead the favoring relations constituted by 
my (or your) attitudes toward things. There is normally going to be a loose-ish pattern 
to them, though one shot through with exceptions. For example, in the main I like chili 
because, in most cases, adding chili to a dish leads me to like it more. But it is not as if 
I have to like a dish more just because chili has been added to it. There are some dishes 
to which adding chili has the reverse effect—its presence makes me like the dish less, or 
not at all. And there is an amount of chili which, if added to almost any dish, will make 
me dislike it. Nevertheless, there remains a pattern of sorts to when I like and do not like 
chili and, as such, it seems true to characterize me as someone who likes chili, because 
typically I do. There is no necessity to any of my tastes—they can and have changed—
and I am not being inconsistent if I like chili in one dish and not in another, or if I like 
chili one day and not the next. So I am a particularist regarding my own favorings and 
disfavorings. Yet this doesn’t stop me, or anyone else, from being able to make informed 
judgments about what I might like—it doesn’t stop anyone from making statistical gen-
eralizations, or inferring that I will most likely enjoy dish p because I enjoyed dish q, and 
dish q seemed relevantly analogous to p.
I think everything I have said about my favorings is also true of the favorings constitutive 
of normative reasons, and thus of moral reasons.3 We are primarily aware of normative 
reasons through a faculty of rational intuition—we call it “our reason” or “intuition”—
and the job of work of our theories is, I think, to characterize the clearest and most 
widely corroborated deliverances of our reason, other things being equal. As a moral 
particularist, moral reasoning about difficult and unclear cases—cases where rational 
2  There’s room for disagreement over exactly how one qualifies as a moral particularist, and I am 
simply describing what I mean by the term. The central contemporary figure in the debate over moral 
particularism is Jonathan Dancy. See Jonathan Dancy, Moral Reasons (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1993). 
The term was first coined, however, by R. M. Hare. See Richard Mervyn Hare, Freedom and Reason 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 18. For a survey of recent developments, see Jennifer Flynn, 
“Recent Work: Moral Particularism,” Analysis 70, no. 1 (2010): 140–48. 
3  This is not to suggest that the favorings constitutive of normative reasons are among our own attitudes. 
I have provided an analysis of normative reasons elsewhere: Gerald K. Harrison, Normative Reasons 
and Theism (Cham, CH: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
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intuitions conflict, or are unclear or untrustworthy—is akin to the kind of reasoning a 
good chef might engage in when trying to devise an original menu for someone whose 
tastes he/she has a fairly good grasp of. The chef will have to make informed judgments 
about what to concoct, based on their understanding of the client’s attitudes toward other 
dishes. The chef will no doubt try and build a mental picture of the client’s taste personal-
ity and use this as an imaginative simulation against which to test proposed dishes and 
flavor combinations. But no matter how careful the reasoning, the proof of the pudding 
is going to remain in the eating.
Likewise then, though I am a normative particularist—and so, by extension, a moral 
particularist—this does not mean I deny that there is any kind of pattern whatever to 
the normative aspect to reality, nor does it mean I deny that we can make statistical gen-
eralizations based on how some feature or features have behaved in other contexts. Just 
as the fact I typically like a savory dish more when chili has been added to it gives me 
default but defeasible reason to believe I will like dish p more if some chili is added to it, 
so too the fact that typically consideration X has, intuitively, operated as a wrong-maker 
in those actions in which it has featured gives us some default but defeasible reason to 
believe that it will operate as a wrong-maker in some other action in which it is featur-
ing. But if it appears, intuitively, not to be doing so, then, other things being equal, that 
is good evidence that it is not doing so in this particular context.
Typical Wrong-Makers 
In this section I will describe numerous features possessed by (typical) procreative 
acts, and will draw attention to the fact that in other contexts these features seem, 
at least in the main, to operate with negative moral valences.4 That does not, of 
course, entail that they operate with negative moral valences in the context of pro-
creative acts—not given the truth of moral particularism, anyway. Nevertheless, 
the fact they typically operate with a negative moral valence makes it reasonable to 
suppose that they will operate this way elsewhere as well, other things being equal. 
Again, and to stress, other things may not be equal in the case of procreative acts. 
But whether this is the case will be the matter addressed in the subsequent section 
and not this one. The point of this section is simply to highlight that a) procreative 
acts standardly possess all of these features and b) these features typically operate 
as moral negatives. 
4  Julia Tanner and I have drawn attention to these elsewhere, albeit much more sketchily.  See Gerald K. 
Harrison and Julia Tanner, “None,” Philosophers’ Magazine 75 (2016): 72–77.
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Consent
No one gives their prior consent to be born. To procreate is therefore inevitably to 
subject someone to a life. And to subject someone to a life is, fairly obviously, to have 
subjected them to something very significant. To procreate is therefore to subject 
someone to something of great significance. 
In other contexts, the fact an act will significantly affect another person without their 
prior consent typically operates as a powerful wrong-making feature of such deeds. 
For example, if someone has not consented to have sex with you—a significant activ-
ity—then, other things being equal, that generates a powerful moral reason not to 
have sex with that person.
It should also be noted that even when an act is likely to benefit the affected party, an 
absence of prior consent still seems, in the main, to operate negatively. For instance, 
if you hack into my bank account and start gambling with my money, then even if 
you make me a fortune, the fact you did not have my prior consent to do so seems 
to be an ethical negative. And this seems to remain the case even where consent is 
not possible, and even when the act seems overall justified. For example, imagine an 
unconscious patient needs an arm removed if they are not to die of septicemia. Due 
to their unconsciousness, they cannot consent. Strange circumstances aside, it is no 
doubt morally justifiable to remove the arm because of the great harm that would 
befall the person otherwise. Nevertheless, the absence of prior consent still seems to 
operate negatively in this context, for it is regrettable that consent was not possible 
and it would have been better had it been given. It is just that in this case the positive 
moral valence possessed by the fact removing the arm will prevent the person from 
dying outweighed the negative moral valence of the fact they did not consent to it. 
Of course, it is “in principle” possible to consent to have one’s arm removed in a way 
that it is not even in principle possible to consent to be created. But affecting another 
significantly without their prior consent seems to operate negatively even in cases 
where consent is more robustly impossible. For instance, if I want someone to work 
for me against their will, then clearly the very nature of what I want prevents me 
from getting anyone to consent to it. Yet this doesn’t mean it is ethically okay for me 
to make someone work for me against their will. Other things being equal, it would 
be wrong to make someone work for me against their will, and wrong in no small 
part because it would involve significantly affecting someone without their prior 
consent. The fact it was impossible to get their prior consent does not seem to alter 
this. 
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It would seem, then, that the fact an act will significantly affect another without 
their prior consent is a fact that can reasonably be expected to operate with a nega-
tive moral valence in an act that features it, other things being equal. As has already 
been noted, procreative acts possess this feature. Yes, it is not possible to give one’s 
prior consent to be created, but we have already seen that in other contexts this 
does not seem to alter the negativity of this feature’s moral valence. And yes, maybe 
procreative acts are ones that are likely to benefit most of those they affect. But we 
have also seen that in other contexts this does not seem to alter the negativity of this 
feature’s moral valence either. In summary, then, procreative acts subject someone 
to a life—which is a very significant thing to do to someone—and they do so without 
the prior consent of the affected party. In other contexts to subject someone to some-
thing significant—even when consent is not possible, and even when it is likely to 
be overall beneficial to them—seems to operate with a negative moral valence. And 
thus if other things are equal, we have reason to believe it operates with a negative 
moral valence in the context of procreative acts as well.5 
Harm 
Living a life is a job of work, and a considerable one at that. Granted, the odds are 
that most parts of the job will be enjoyed by most of those who have been made to 
do them (though there is absolutely no guarantee of this). But by no means is all of 
the work pleasant. Indeed, large parts of the job are extremely painful, demeaning, 
undignified, and frightening.
For instance, it begins badly. We emerge naked and screaming from the nether re-
gions of another person. A less dignified way of beginning one’s career here is hard 
to imagine. And then we find ourselves ignorant, uncultured, and unsophisticated. 
We cannot feed or clothe ourselves for a considerable period of time, and will be de-
pendent on the goodwill of others for our survival for many years. To stand any real 
chance of thriving in the rest of our lives, we will need to be forced to endure years of 
careful, dedicated schooling by a host of experts. And for many of us our ignorance 
and dependency will return once more at the other end of life, as our bodies start 
degenerating. And whether our bodies go to wrack and ruin or not, nearly all of us 
will live in fear of this happening.
5  A more detailed antinatalist case that focuses on the importance of consent is that presented 
by Seana Shiffrin. See Seana Shiffrin, “Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the 
Significance of Harm,” Legal Theory 5, no. 2 (1999): 117–48. 
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There is also the indignity of not knowing what our lives are about, if anything, and 
yet being addicted to living them. Most of us would do virtually anything—includ-
ing the most degrading of things—to stay alive. This, it seems to me, is an indignity 
and therefore a harm. Life is a gift, it is said. But it is a gift in the way that injecting 
someone with heroin and then providing them with a lifetime’s supply of the drug 
is a gift. 
Furthermore, and as anyone who has lived here for any period of time knows only 
too well, this world is an extremely dangerous place. It contains large numbers of 
murderers, rapists, and thieves and even greater numbers of lower-level mean-spir-
ited, ungenerous, unkind people. It also contains almost every conceivable disease 
and disaster. They happen all the time and they befall people largely arbitrarily, at 
least from the perspective of justice. And as such it is practically impossible to avoid 
these harms. 
And anyone who lives here will, it seems, eventually die. So they will become invest-
ed in a life, and then they will lose it. And they will become invested in other people, 
and then they will lose them.  
I do not wish to catalog any further the harms that we all know lie in wait for any-
one living a life. The point here is that there are many of them and that, other things 
being equal, the fact that an act will subject another person to many harms is a fact 
about an act that, typically, operates with a negative moral valence. The fact that 
stepping on your toe will cause you the harm of pain provides me with a moral rea-
son not to step on your toe. Likewise, then, the fact that procreative acts will subject 
another to a catalog of harms of the kind mentioned above, and others besides, is a 
fact that—other things being equal—can be expected to generate moral reason not 
to perform the act in question. 
Of course, life also contains many benefits. We fall in love with people it is good for 
us to fall in love with, we enjoy ourselves a lot of the time (if we are lucky), and we 
witness much beautiful scenery and often perform good deeds and exhibit fine char-
acter traits. And if an act promotes these sorts of benefits, then that is a fact about it 
that, typically anyway, operates with a positive moral valence.
But importantly there seems to be an asymmetry between benefits and harms here. 
Consider: if I know that, were I to have a child, the child’s life would be one char-
acterized by intense suffering, then—other things being equal—that fact seems to 
generate a powerful moral reason not to have a child. That is, it operates as a wrong-
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maker, and, other things being equal, it would be wrong for me to create that child. 
But by contrast, if I know that, were I to have a child, the child’s life would be charac-
terized by intense joy, then—other things being equal—that does not seem to gener-
ate a positive obligation to have the child.
There are different diagnoses one might offer of this quandary. The most influential 
has been offered by David Benatar, who draws the moral that absent benefits are not 
bad unless there is someone for whom they constitute a deprivation, whereas—by 
contrast—absent harms are good even though there may be no one for whom they 
are a benefit.6   But for my purposes here it is enough that we merely note that though 
procreative acts create benefits to those whom they create, in this particular con-
text—that is, in the context of acts that create the person that they affect, as opposed 
to acts that affect an already existing person—this fact does not seem to operate as a 
right-maker. That is, the benefits contained in a potential life do not seem to gener-
ate moral reason to create the life in question. By contrast, the harms contained in a 
potential life do seem to generate moral reasons not to create the life. 
Harm to Other Species and the Environment
If an act carries a high risk of causing significant harm to the creatures of other spe-
cies and their environments, then this feature will typically operate with a negative 
moral valence. For example, wantonly chopping down a tree that contains many 
nesting birds and other wildlife seems wrong, and wrong in no small part because of 
the harm it will cause to the creatures living in the tree. So, if an act will cause signifi-
cant harm to other creatures and their environments, then this typically generates a 
moral reason not to perform the act in question.  
I think it is also fairly uncontroversial that acts of human procreation possess this 
feature. The average human will typically act in ways that will bring about the deaths 
of many animals every year, often for no better reason than because the human in 
question likes the taste of their dead bodies, and/or wearing bits of them. So creating 
a new human life will almost certainly cause the deaths of many hundreds of other 
animals over its entire course. Furthermore it is clear that humans have an ongoing 
practice of colonizing territory being used by other creatures with scant regard for 
their welfare. Thus procreative acts, by bringing into existence humans who will 
6   For a good discussion of Benatar’s arguments, see the entire edition of the South African Journal of 
Philosophy 31, no. 1 (2012), edited by Thaddeus Metz. It includes various papers that support and argue 
against Benatar’s view, as well as a reply from Benatar. 
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almost certainly do significant harm to other creatures and their environments, pos-
sess a feature that, in other contexts, has a negative moral valence. 
Imagine, for instance, that humans procreated in the manner of Glomerata wasps. 
That is, imagine we have to inject human larvae into, say, live calves (Glomerata 
wasps inject their larvae into living caterpillars). The human larvae then live inside 
their living host, slowly eating their way out, a process that eventually kills the calf. 
Well, would a halfway decent person procreate if that is what it took? I think not. The 
calf ’s welfare matters, and if creating a new human life required that a calf be eaten 
alive from the inside out, then that fact can be expected to generate a powerful moral 
reason not to procreate. There does not seem to be a relevant difference between the 
calf case and regular cases of human procreation, for we all know well enough that 
human procreative acts will in fact cause considerable suffering and death to other 
creatures (including, of course, many calves). And so, other things being equal, it 
seems reasonable to assume that this fact operates with a powerful negative moral 
valence in the context of human procreative acts. 
Loving Relationships 
When we are created we imprint on the first people we have any extended contact 
with—normally our parents of course—and we will typically fall unconditionally 
in love with them. Likewise, those who create new lives almost invariably imprint 
on those they have created, and tend to fall unconditionally in love with them too. 
Most, I think it is fair to say, see these unconditional loving relationships as won-
derful, positively features of procreative activities. Indeed, it is plausible that many 
procreate precisely in order to realize these supposed goods. The love that parents 
have for their offspring, and that their offspring have for them, is seen as among the 
chief prizes of life. 
However, it is interesting to note that these loving relationships are not, at base, 
the product of predominantly reason-responsive processes. Far from it, they are, we 
might say, biological rather than rational. That is, they are not the result of, nor are 
they particularly responsive to, free choices and assessments. We imprint on whom-
ever we first encounter for a sustained period, regardless of their character, and like-
wise where our parents are concerned. Whatever child they had created—that is, 
whatever its character and personality—they would have imprinted on it. And most 
are well aware of this; as already noted, many have children precisely because they 
wish to love and be loved in this way. The automatic and unconditional nature of it 
all is part of its appeal. 
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But this is ethically very significant, I think, because in other contexts loving rela-
tionships that have arisen in this way seem far from ideal. Indeed, such relationships 
seem more akin to addictions or sicknesses. And those who intentionally seek to 
create them seem thereby to be doing something wrong. The love they create seems 
to present an obstacle to true flourishing rather than to be a constituent of it. It may 
not be an insurmountable obstacle, because that which we have loved blindly we 
can come to love with open eyes. But it is an obstacle nevertheless. And intention-
ally trying to create one of these nonrational, obstacle-to-flourishing loving relation-
ships—even as a means to acquiring a rational one—seems to be a fact with a nega-
tive moral valence. Indeed, quite a powerful negative moral valence if my intuitions 
are anything to go by. 
For instance, Jack wants very much to be loved. He pines after his neighbour, Jane. But 
he believes that if he were to approach her in the normal way he would say such ridicu-
lous things that it would ruin any prospect of a relationship between them. However, he 
has recently read about Stockholm syndrome and so knows that kidnap victims have a 
heightened tendency to fall in love with their kidnappers, regardless of who their kid-
nappers may be. So, knowing this, he decides to kidnap Jane and hold her in his base-
ment for a while, gambling that under these circumstances Stockholm syndrome will set 
in and she’ll fall in love with him. The plan succeeds and she does fall in love with him. 
He unchains her and they live happily ever after.
That is not a charming love story, is it? Of course, part of the problem is the fact Jack act-
ed wrongly—seriously wrongly—in kidnapping Jane. But what should not be overlooked 
is that compounding this wrong is the fact that Jack has manipulated Jane into falling 
in love with him. That Jack wanted Jane to love him via inducing Stockholm syndrome 
is not a fact about Jack’s act that makes it better, but seems if anything to make it worse. 
Similarly, the fact that Jane did indeed fall in love with him does not make the situation 
better either, but makes her even more of a victim of Jack’s wrongdoing than she might 
otherwise have been. For now she has not only been kidnapped, but also infected with a 
strong affection for her kidnapper.
Note too that even if Jane subsequently comes to love Jack in a more rational way—that 
is, she imprints on him, but over time comes to love him in virtue of certain qualities he 
has, and then becomes reason responsive in respect of these qualities such that were he 
radically to change she would cease to love him—the relationship’s origins still remain 
a bad part of the love story and taint it. And certainly, Jack’s act still seems wrong (and 
seems wrong even if Jack anticipated that Jane would eventually come to love him in a 
more rational, reason-responsive way).
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Another example: John, like Jack, wants to be loved. But rather than Stockholm syn-
drome, he has been reading about the phenomenon of transference in which a therapy 
patient will often unconsciously transfer strong emotions about significant others to the 
therapist. Inspired by this, he undertakes to become a therapist in order to exploit this 
tendency among patients. That is, he sees in the phenomenon of transference not a prob-
lem to be managed and tackled, but an opportunity to be exploited for his own emo-
tional ends. He hopes that, through transference, he will become the object of another’s 
loving affection. As with Jack, his plan works well and a patient, Joan, falls in love with 
him via the transference process.
Again, this is an unsettling love story, not a wholesome one. Intuitively John behaved 
badly and Joan is John’s victim. Her feelings for him were not hard won through a suit-
ably reason-responsive process of reflection and assessment, but were the product of 
nonrational processes that John knew about and cynically exploited. And John’s act of 
becoming a therapist in order to exploit transference processes seems reprehensible. 
There are good reasons to become a therapist, and bad reasons to become a therapist, 
and John’s reasons seem squarely to be in the bad camp. And they seem to belong in this 
camp precisely because they involve becoming a therapist in order to generate a bad kind 
of love from another. And in what does the badness of this love reside, apart from in the 
fact that it is a love that is not the product of suitably reason-responsive processes?
At the risk of laboring the point, consider as well what Christians typically say about 
God and the existence of evil in the world. For their explanations invariably mention two 
things: love and free will. They will often admit that God could, in principle, have created 
us such that we would automatically and inevitably love him. However, they point out, 
correctly surely, that such a love would not be of a valuable kind, and would not be of 
a sort that a good person would seek to be the object of. After all, were God to do such 
a thing, he would be no better than Jack or John, and the consequent love his creatures 
would feel for him would be of the unhealthy sort that Jane and Joan have been made to 
feel for Jack and John. 
Christians then typically go on to emphasise that love of the kind worth giving and re-
ceiving, and so love of the kind a good god would want to be the object of, must be given 
freely. Yet, the account continues, even God could not have created free agents and at 
the same time determined that they would fall in love with him in the valuable way. All 
God could do is create the circumstances in which such love becomes a possibility. And 
what that requires is for God to relinquish control over his creations—which is in part 
what creates the possibility of evil—and to create a distance between himself and them. 
As Hick says,  
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Within such a situation there is the possibility of the human being coming freely 
to know and love one’s Maker. Indeed, if the end state which God is seeking to 
bring about is one in which finite persons have come in their own freedom to 
know and love God, this requires creating them initially in a state which is not 
that of their already knowing and loving God. For it is logically impossible to 
create beings already in a state of having come into that state by their own free 
choices.7 
Now regardless of what we think of the credibility of this as an explanation of the world’s 
evils, my point is that it appeals to core intuitions of the very kind I have been appealing 
to above.8 For it emphasizes the idea that loving relationships of the valuable kind, and of 
the kind that good people are wont to try and cultivate—are a product of free decisions 
and assessments. By contrast, loving relationships that are not so produced are ones that 
good people seem to go out of their way not to cultivate. 
Now obviously a great deal more could and, ideally, should be said about the suitably 
reason-responsive processes that are at the heart of good loving relationships. But it is 
clearly beyond the scope of this essay to do that. Happily, for my purposes it is sufficient 
to note that loving relationships that are the product of processes that are not at all, 
or barely, reason responsive seem—in the main, anyway—to be relationships that it is 
wrong to cultivate intentionally. That was the kind of love that Jack and John sought to 
cultivate, and it is the kind that Christians believe a good god would not seek to cultivate. 
So if it is a fact about an act that it will create such relationships, then that is likely to be a 
fact that will operate with a negative moral valence. And if such an act is performed with 
the intention of creating such relationships, then that fact about the act is also likely to 
have a negative moral valence. 
7  John Hick, “Soul-Making Theodicy,” in Philosophy of Religion Selected Readings, 2nd ed., ed. 
Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 306.
8  In fact, antinatalist views generate a novel perspective on the problem of evil for the traditional 
conception of God. For if antinatalism is true and other things are equal, then no perfectly good, 
omnipotent, omniscient being would create new life. Thus, if antinatalism is true, we are not the 
creation of such a god. But if God exists, then by definition we are the creations of such a god (God is 
typically defined as the creator of everything apart from himself). Therefore it would seem that God 
does not exist if antinatalism is true. I should perhaps also say that, speaking personally, it does not 
seem to me to be any good or noble thing to create creatures and make them walk in the valley of the 
shadow of death so that they might come freely to love you. And relatedly, if you find yourself walking 
in the valley of the shadow of death, then it does not seem any good or noble thing for you to do to 
make some innocent children follow you (even if they come freely to love you). 
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Yet it is loving relationships of this un–reason responsive kind that parents have with 
their offspring and offspring with their parents, at least initially. For it seems undeniable 
that the newly created imprint on those whom they first encounter fo any period of time, 
and undeniable that most parents imprint on their offspring. Indeed, it is hard to think 
of a less reason-responsive love than this sort. Furthermore, it seems likely that many 
procreative acts are performed partly in order to create loving relationships of this kind. 
That is, many seem to want to be the object of these kinds of automatic, unconditional 
loving affections, and procreate knowing that their offspring will almost certainly love 
them in precisely this way. So once more we have procreative acts possessing features 
that, in other contexts, seem to operate with a powerful negative moral valence. And so, 
if other things are equal, then it is reasonable to suppose that this is how they will operate 
in this context as well. 
Prejudices
It seems morally bad to prioritize the interests of another if one is doing so for no 
better reason than that they are a member of the same sex or race as oneself. And 
such racist and sexist dispositions seem bad not just due to the detrimental conse-
quences that may result for the relevant sex or race. These compound the badness 
of such dispositions. But even if a person is never going to get the opportunity to 
exercise their racist or sexist disposition, it still seems bad in and of itself just to be in 
possession of it. We—persons, that is—are morally valuable irrespective of our sexes 
or races, not because of them. Thus, we are owed respect and goodwill from each 
other irrespective of what race or sex we belong to. 
If there were a recreational drug that had as a side effect that it would most likely 
instill or accentuate racist and sexist dispositions, then that would—typically, any-
way—generate a moral reason not to take that drug.9 And it seems clear that it would 
do this even if most people regularly take the drug in question, and enjoy taking it, 
and are brazen and proud of their subsequent racist and sexist attitudes. 
Bearing all this in mind, there seems no fundamental difference between prioritiz-
ing the interests of others due to their being members of the same sex or race and 
prioritizing the interests of others due to their being members of the same genetic 
family. For exactly the same points apply, surely. No less than a person’s sex or race, 
a person’s genetic family is irrelevant to the moral value of that person. We are owed 
respect and goodwill from others irrespective of the genetic family to which we be-
9  Julia Tanner and I make this point in Harrison and Tanner, “None,” 75–76.
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long, rather than because of it. Indeed, it is easy enough to imagine someone who has 
no genetic family whatsoever—a magical agent who just pops into existence from 
nowhere—and intuitively it seems clear that this person is owed the same respect 
and goodwill as any other. So the familyist—the person who prioritizes the interests 
of family members simply because they are family members—seems to exhibit the 
same vice as the racist and the sexist. In all of these cases we have people prioritizing 
the interests of one person over another on the basis of some feature that is irrelevant 
to the moral importance of that person.
It is important to stress, however, that I am not for a moment denying that there can 
often be moral reasons to be partial to some people over others, even when there is 
no difference in the inherent moral value of the people involved. For instance, intui-
tively I owe special obligations to my partner and my friends and my parents and my 
siblings. If my partner needs a kidney and mine are a match, then I think I almost 
certainly have an obligation to donate one to her. Yet if a stranger needed a kidney 
and mine were a match, then—if my intuitions are to be trusted, anyway—I am not 
similarly obligated to make the sacrifice. Clearly there is no difference in moral value 
between my partner and the stranger. It is just that I stand in a relationship to my 
partner that I do not stand in to the stranger, and this seems to make all the differ-
ence in this case. The same is true of my friends and my parents and my siblings. I 
am in relationships with them all, and these relationships affect my obligations to-
ward them, even though they have no bearing on their inherent moral value.
Soran Reader has said something very helpful here: 
The main criterion which distinguishes relationships from mere relations, is 
that a relationship involves an actual connection between agent and patient, 
a real “something between” them which links them together. This “something 
between” can be thought of as a kind of contact or presence of the relata to each 
other. Where there is “nothing between,” there is no relationship.10
She continues,
Although my concept of relationship is broad, several kinds of relation fall 
outside it. First, the relation of sharing a property falls short of having a 
relationship. I agree with Samuel Scheffler when he points out that relations 
consisting of shared superficial properties are not relationships, for example 
having a surname with the same number of letters. But I think we can go 
10  Soran Reader, “Distance, Relationship, and Moral Obligation,” Monist 86, no. 3 (2003): 370–71.
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further. Having shared properties, simpliciter, is not a relationship, whether 
the properties are superficial, non-superficial or even essential. For example, 
having had a heart transplant is a non-superficial contingent property two 
people might share. But it is not a relationship, because it involves no actual 
connection, nothing between the persons which links them together.11 
That sounds quite right to me. I have moral reason to donate a kidney to my part-
ner because I stand in a relationship to her that I do not stand in to the stranger. 
Importantly, however, merely having things in common with another person—
such as being the same race, or the same sex, or being members of the same fam-
ily—does not constitute a relationship of the kind that seems to generate special 
obligations. I do not, for instance, owe any special obligations to a clone of my 
partner—I am not obliged to give her a kidney if she needs one—despite her be-
ing a member of the same family, sex, and race as my actual partner. For being 
the same family, sex, and race as another person is merely to have things in com-
mon with them, and that is not yet to be in a relationship with a person. So, I have 
special moral obligations to my parents and siblings not because we share genetic 
material in common, but because of the relationship we have come to stand in to 
each other.  
If all this is correct, then there would seem to be no fundamental difference be-
tween racist, sexist, and familyist dispositions. And that means that, if other things 
are equal, we can reasonably infer from the moral negativity of racist and sexist 
attitudes the moral negativity of familyist attitudes. And, as such, we can then 
reasonably conclude that if it is a fact about an act that it is will most likely either 
instill or accentuate a familyist disposition, then this is a fact that will most likely 
operate with a negative moral valence. That is, other things being equal, it is rea-
sonable to suppose that we have moral reason not to perform acts that will likely 
instill or accentuate familyist dispositions.
This clearly is a fact about most procreative acts. For if one procreates, chances are 
that one will either find that a familyist attitude becomes instilled or that one’s ex-
isting familyist dispositions are accentuated. Indeed, in my experience many par-
ents—indeed, many people—are quite brazen about their familyist attitudes, and 
think nothing of proudly declaring that blood is blood and that family comes first.
11  Ibid., 374. 
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Intuitive Natalism
Above I have described numerous features that, typically, seem to operate with nega-
tive moral valences. And I have noted that most procreative acts possess them all. 
Therefore other things being equal, it seems reasonable to suppose that they will 
operate with negative moral valences in the context of procreative acts. That is the 
default.
However, other things appear far from equal. For acts of human procreation are not 
ones about which most have no clear moral intuitions. Far from it: virtually every-
one seems to get the impression such acts are morally permissible (even praisewor-
thy). Indeed, the intuition that most human procreative acts are morally permissible 
seems as clear and distinct and widely corroborated as the intuitions about the moral 
negativity of the features in the contexts described above. So isn’t there something 
perverse in allowing, as I have been inviting us to do, our intuitions about the moral 
valences of the features in cases other than procreative ones determine our judg-
ments about the procreative ones? After all, if moral particularism is true, then we 
know already that no moral valences are fixed and as such it is entirely possible that 
a feature that operates negatively in most other cases simply doesn’t operate that way 
in the context of procreative acts. So, isn’t the sensible thing to do here to take both 
sets of intuitions at face value and conclude that human procreation is an exception-
al case? After all, our best evidence that we have an exception on our hands is that 
the considerations in question are not appearing to make the act in which they are 
featuring wrong. And isn’t that precisely what—by my own lights—appears to be the 
case where most procreative acts are concerned? Yes, procreative acts are acts that 
significantly affect another without their prior consent, and they harm the welfare 
of other species, and they instill what, in other contexts, seem to be prejudicial at-
titudes, and generate what, in other contexts, would seem to be unhealthy kinds of 
unconditional devotion. But perhaps in the context of procreative acts specifically 
these features do not operate as wrong-makers, for after all, they do not appear to be 
doing so.
I take this objection seriously and accept entirely that if a consideration appears to 
most people not to be operating as a wrong-maker in a particular context, then—
other things being equal—that really is excellent evidence that it is not operating as 
a wrong-maker in that particular context. But once again, other things are not equal, 
or so I would claim. For though clear and widely corroborated moral intuitions are 
typically good evidence in support of what they represent to be the case, that is not 
always and everywhere true. Sometimes there are considerations that discredit the 
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probative force that clear and widely corroborated moral intuitions would other-
wise have. And this, I shall argue, is precisely the case in respect of the widespread 
intuition that procreative acts are morally permissible. They do appear to be morally 
permissible, but in this case appearances count for nothing. If I am right about this, 
then when it comes to the ethics of procreative acts, our most reliable source of in-
sight into their morality will be the typical moral valences of their features.
Defeating the Intuitions
Imagine I have the intuition that Xing—an act that has several features that normally 
operate as wrong-makers in other contexts—is morally permissible. It is not that Xing 
appears to have additional features that seem to be operating as right-makers and whose 
positive moral valence is countervailing the negative moral valence of its wrong-makers. 
No, it seems that Xing is just plain morally permissible—there seems nothing wrong 
about it; that is, nothing about it seems to be operating with a negative moral valence. 
Other things being equal, this is good evidence that Xing is morally permissible and 
that the features that elsewhere operate as wrong-makers are simply not doing so in this 
context.  
But now imagine that I subsequently find out that I have just come from visiting a hypno-
tist who is notorious for implanting in those who visit him the posthypnotic suggestion 
that Xing is entirely morally permissible, and that he implants this in people regardless 
of the actual moral permissibility of Xing. Well, now I have a defeater for my intuition 
that Xing is morally permissible.12 That is, this information about how I have most likely 
acquired the intuition discredits it. If I have acquired the intuition via posthypnotic sug-
gestion, then it provides me with no more reason to think Xing is permissible than it 
does to think it is impermissible. That is, it counts for nothing in terms of evidence. 
That, I contend, is exactly how things are where the morality of procreative acts is con-
cerned. For the widely shared intuition that procreative acts are morally permissible 
seems most likely to have been implanted by blind evolutionary processes alone, and 
this, no less than implantation by a hypnotist, undermines their credibility as evidence.
Consider first that our intuitions about the morality of our actions have a significant 
impact on how we behave. If an activity appears wrong, then we typically do not do it 
(the precise nature of the link between our motivations and our moral judgments, and 
between our motivations and our actions, are matters of controversy, but that there is a 
12  John Pollock and Joseph Cruz, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1986), 38.
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connection is not). In turn, how we behave significantly affects our reproductive success. 
For example, those of our ancestors who got the intuition that reproduction is immoral 
would, in the main, have tried hard not to do it. Now it seems very credible that those 
of our ancestors who tried hard not to reproduce would have been significantly less re-
productively successful than those who did the opposite. And thus the disposition to get 
the intuition that reproducing is morally wrong is one that is unlikely to be favored by 
a process of evolution by natural selection. By contrast, the intuition that procreation is 
morally permissible—indeed, good and wholesome—is likely to be favored by such pro-
cesses, because those of our ancestors who got that intuition would have actively tried 
to procreate, and actively trying to procreate is, strange circumstances aside, likely to be 
a reproductively successful strategy. Hence, quelle surprise, virtually everyone gets the 
intuition that procreation is morally permissible and good and praiseworthy. Getting it 
“helped our ancestors make more babies,” as Richard Joyce might say.13 
If that is the whole story about why we get such an intuition, then it seems to me that it 
discredits it. For there is no reason to think that the truth or otherwise of such an intu-
ition had anything to do with why most reason-responsive agents have come to be prey 
to it. As Huemer explains,  
The fact that evolutionary pressures explain our having some cognitive or 
perceptual faculty does not in general undermine trust in that faculty. Evolution 
explains why we have eyes and ears, why we have the capacity for reasoning 
about the physical world, and why we have the capacity to learn languages. In 
none of these cases does an evolutionary account of the origin of our faculty 
undermine trust in that faculty: no one argues that our vision, reasoning, or 
language apprehension is unreliable because it is a product of natural selection. 
So why should ethics be any different? The answer is that in the case of nonmoral 
faculties, there is a reason why accuracy should be selected for. Accurate 
nonevaluative beliefs are usually useful for attaining one’s goals; therefore, if a 
conscious organism is generally well adapted, so that its desires are generally 
in line with what would promote its own reproductive fitness, then, as a rule, 
more accurate factual beliefs will increase its fitness. For instance, if one wants 
to avoid predators, then correct beliefs about where predators are located will 
benefit one.14  
Being fairly reliably hooked up to the physical aspect of reality, if physical aspect there 
be, can be expected to confer a considerable reproductive advantage. It enabled our an-
13  Richard Joyce, The Evolution of Morality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 2.
14  Michael Huemer, “Revisionary Intuitionism,” Social Philosophy and Policy 25, no. 1 (2008): 376–77. 
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cestors to survive long enough to reproduce, and enhanced their ability to find someone 
with whom to mate. Hence why most of us today find ourselves reliably hooked up to it. 
Thus, an evolutionary account of the development of our sensible faculties does not, in 
the main, give us reason to doubt their reliability, at least not when it comes to informing 
us about the location, size, and shape of things. But by contrast, the normative aspect to 
reality is not where potential mates reside, and it has no sharp edges and long drops. As 
such there is no special reason to think there would be selective pressure in the direction 
of accurate normative intuitions, other things being equal. Again, back to Huemer: 
If an organism has generally accurate non evaluative beliefs, it cannot be 
assumed that, in general, its also having objectively correct values will increase 
its reproductive fitness. Rather, an organism’s reproductive fitness would seem 
to be best promoted by its having values skewed in a certain direction: by the 
organism’s taking its own reproductive success, to be good, whether or not 
those things are objectively good.  The crucial asymmetry is that non evaluative 
beliefs typically function to help us select the correct means of achieving our 
goals, whereas evaluative beliefs typically influence what goals we seek. Natural 
selection could be expected to favour individuals whose goals are in line with 
the “goals” of evolution, and who take the correct means of achieving their 
goals.15 
Of course, ahead of investigation there is no special reason to think the normative aspect 
to reality won’t consist of objective favorings of behavior likely to increase reproductive 
fitness. But by the same token, there seems no special reason to think it would contain 
such objective favorings either. The point, rather, is that those agents who got the impres-
sion procreation was permissible and good and praiseworthy would be the ones favored 
by a process of natural selection, regardless of the actual content of the normative aspect 
to reality. So, irrespective of the accuracy of the intuition that procreation is permissible, 
those who got it would be selected for. The clear and widely felt intuition that human 
procreative acts are morally permissible seems to me, then, to be one we have good rea-
son to think has no real probative force. It seems highly likely that we have it due to the 
operation of selective pressures alone. Just as the hypnotist’s indifference toward ethical 
truth discredits the intuition that Xing is morally permissible, so too the indifference 
of natural selection toward the ethics of procreation discredits our moral intuition that 
procreation is morally permissible.  Again, this is not to say that procreation is therefore 
wrong. It is just to note that the intuition that it is permissible does not count for any-
thing, and thus to gain insight into its ethics we need to look elsewhere. 
15  Ibid., 377. 
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But what of the intuitions I appealed to when drawing attention to the typically negative 
moral valences of the features I identified above—can they be similarly undercut? Per-
haps, but I do not think so.16 For instance, the intuition that it is important not to make 
significant impositions on another without their prior consent hardly seems like one that 
selective pressures alone would favor one having, other things being equal. For as I have 
already argued, rational reflection upon it will lead one to conclude that procreating is 
something we have moral reason not to do, for procreative acts themselves make signifi-
cant impositions on those they bring into this realm, and they do so without the prior 
consent of those parties. So, absent the intuition that procreation is permissible, having 
this intuition will lead one to the conclusion that procreation is positively impermissible, 
which on the face of it seems about as far from an adaptive intuition as one can get.
The intuition that the harms contained in a life generate a moral reason not to create 
it, whereas the benefits contained in a life generate no moral reason to create it is, once 
more, not one we would expect to be favored by natural selection. For again, other things 
being equal, having it will lead one to conclude that we have moral reason not to procre-
ate.
Similarly, the intuition that in determining what we should do we should weigh along-
side the interests of our own species the interests of other species, regardless of their 
usefulness to the flourishing of our own, is again hardly one that we might reasonably 
expect a processes of natural selection to favor us having. For reason-responsive humans 
who do get such intuitions, and who are relatively observant of our impact on the world 
are likely to draw the conclusion that, for the sake of the interests of other species, we 
ought not to procreate.
Likewise for those intuitions that imply there is something ethically problematic in 
wanting to be loved automatically and unconditionally, and in wanting to have one’s 
own little tribe of acolytes. Having such intuitions means that, other things being equal, 
one will not see the possession of such desires as good, and one will not see in the fact 
16  Needless to say, there are some who think evolutionary debunking accounts can be given of all ethical 
intuitions (or at least, they will be debunking if some kind of objective ethics is assumed). See Sharon 
Street, “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value,” Philosophical Studies 127, no. 1 (2006): 
117–48; and  Joyce, Evolution of Morality. I, like most others, do not think this is true. It seems self-
defeating as any case for anything must appeal to some normative intuitions, as I argue in Harrison, 
Normative Reasons and Theism, 96–100. And if some normative reasons have to be admitted to exist, 
then it is hard to see why the reality of moral reasons should be denied. I clearly believe targeted 
debunking arguments are possible, such as the one I am making here. But I do not believe debunking 
arguments can be given for all moral reasons, only a subset.
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that by procreating one can satisfy such ethically problematic desires any kind of reason 
to do so. Again, that does not seem to be a reproductively successful conclusion to draw.
And finally, the intuition that we have no special reason to prefer someone just because 
they share genetic material in common with us—indeed, that we have reason to view 
such a disposition as positively bad—is again hardly one we would expect natural selec-
tion to favor.  Quite the opposite: we would expect biological processes to favor agents 
who got the impression that they do have reason to prioritize those with whom they 
share genetic material. And of course, we—many of us—do get those intuitions too. The 
point is just that the latter can now be seen to have no credibility precisely because selec-
tive pressures seem most likely to be responsible for why we have them. That does not 
seem to be true of the former intuitions, to their credit.
So all of the intuitions I have appealed to seem, from the perspective of reproductive fit-
ness, perverse. For whether taken singly or together they imply that procreative acts are 
positively immoral, at least in the main. As such I think we have no reason to doubt their 
accuracy. By contrast, the fact that most of us have the intuition that human procreation 
is morally permissible—and that as such it represents a case where the above consider-
ations seem to cease to operate as wrong-makers—looks suspiciously like an intuition 
that selective pressures would favor. And thus the best explanation of why we get that 
intuition about human procreation is not that it is accurate, but that it enabled our ances-
tors to breed more successfully.
Conclusion
I have noted the typically negative moral valence of a number of features. And I have 
noted that procreative acts typically possess all of them. 
However, human procreation seems to most to be permissible and even good and praise-
worthy. If moral particularism is true, and if other things are equal, then this would be 
evidence that procreative acts are an exception and all of these features cease to operate 
negatively in such a context.
I argued that other things are far from equal. The intuition that human procreation is 
permissible is an intuition that seems best explained by the operation of blind evolution-
ary processes alone. And this, I argued, discredits it because there seems no good reason 
to think such processes will favor normative truth in this area. By contrast, the intuitions 
about the wrong-making tendencies of the features I drew attention to are all intuitions 
that would not enhance an agent’s reproductive fitness. For they are intuitions that, taken 
at face value, would lead one to conclude that human procreation is immoral (at least in 
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the main). Thus it seems reasonable to think these intuitions are accurate, other things 
being equal.  
If the intuition that human procreation is morally permissible lacks probative force, then 
our most reliable source of insight into the ethics of human procreation will be our in-
tuitions about the typical moral valences of its features. Again: the features I described 
typically operate with negative moral valences. All of them are possessed by procreative 
acts, and so we now have good reason to suppose that they operate negatively here as 
well. And if that is true, then it seems most likely that procreative acts are overall wrong, 
especially if they do not possess features that we have good reason to suppose operate 
with countervailing positive moral valences (a possibility space has not allowed me to 
consider here, but that I am skeptical about). For they significantly affect another without 
that person’s prior consent; they create harms both to the person and to others species 
that we have moral reason not to create; they create loving relationships of an intuitively 
bad kind; and they instill or accentuate apparently bad attitudes. In this way, then, I ar-
rive at the conclusion that typical acts of human procreation are most likely wrong, and 
wrong consistent with the truth of moral particularism. 
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